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I. INTRODUCTION
In its recent decision of Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,'
the Supreme Court of the United States imposed a new limitation on
plaintiffs seeking recovery for wage discrimination under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.2 In an opinion authored by justice Alito,
the Court reversed established circuit court law in holding that each
paycheck received by a plaintiff that is "infected" by a prior discrimi-
natory gender- or race-based decision does not, on its own, constitute
an unlawful practice.' Prior to this decision, courts operated under
the "paycheck accrual rule," which tolled the 180- or 300-day limita-
tions period for filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Commission (EEOC) each time a plaintiff received a pay-
check that was allegedly tainted by "prior discriminatory conduct...
no matter how long ago the discrimination occurred. 4 In Ledbetter,
* J.D., May 2009, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2006, Drew Universi-
ty. I would like to thank my advisor, Professor Tristin K. Green, as well as my com-
ment editor, Sean Mulryne, both of whom provided me with invaluable guidance,
advice, and support throughout the drafting of this Comment.1 550 U.S. 618 (2007).
2 Id. at 645-46; see also Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(2000).
3 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 621.
4 Id. at 633; see also Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385, 395 (1986) (per curiam);
see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1). The statute provides:
A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and
eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred..
. except that in a case of an unlawful employment practice with respect
to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with
a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief ... or to in-
stitute criminal proceedings .... such charge shall be filed .. .within
three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice
occurred ....
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
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the Court chose to limit the application of the paycheck accrual rule
to situations in which an employer issued paychecks in accordance
with a facially discriminatory pay structure, 5 or when the continuation
of the salary disparity stemmed from a current discriminatory intent.6
The new limitations imposed by the Court placed employees who
have unknowingly received paychecks that further past discrimina-
tion, but are nevertheless implemented pursuant to a "facially nondi-
scriminatory and neutrally applied" pay structure, beyond the protec-
tion of Title VII after the limitations period has tolled . In her
vehement dissent, Justice Ginsburg stated that "[a] ny annual pay de-
cision not contested immediately ... becomes grandfathered, a fait
accompli beyond the province of Title VII ever to repair. '8 Justice
Ginsburg characterized the Court's decision as a "cramped interpre-
tation of Title VII, incompatible with the statute's broad remedial
purpose,"9 and called upon the legislature to correct the Court's rul-
ing.' 0 In the wake of the Court's holding, the majority of plaintiffs
must have filed their claims with the EEOC within 180 or 300 days of
the allegedly discriminatory pay decision or otherwise lose their Title
VII claim forever."
In response to the Court's ruling, Congress passed the Lilly Led-
better Fair Pay Act into law to restore the paycheck accrual rule to its
previous condition. 12 As drafted, the Act states that "an unlawful em-
ployment practice occurs ... when an individual is affected by appli-
cation of a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice,
5 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 636-37.
6 Id. at 634.
7 Id. at 637 (quoting Lorance v. AT&T Tech., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 911 (1989)).
The new limitations are particularly troublesome when viewed in conjunction with
the observation that most employees are not given sufficient access to information to
decipher when wage discrimination has taken place and, therefore, would likely miss
the opportunity to bring their claim due to a lack of adequate information. See Leo-
nard Bierman & Rafael Gely, "Love, Sex and Politics? Sure. Salary? No Way": Workplace
Social Norms and the Law, 25 BERKELEYJ. EMp. & LAB. L. 167, 168 (2004); see also infra
note 142 and accompanying text.
8 Id. at 644 (GinsburgJ., dissenting).
9 Id. at 661; see asoJeffrey M. Fisher, In the Wake of Lorance v. AT&T Technolo-
gies, Inc.: Interpreting Title Vll's Statute of Limitations for Facially Neutral Seniority Systems,
1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 711, 712 n.7 (1990) (recognizing the congressional intent to ap-
ply Title VII in a broad manner).
10 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 661 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
1 Id. at 628-29.
12 153 CONG. REc. H8940-02, H8945 (2007) (statement of Rep. Hirono) ("The
bill reinstates the paycheck accrual rule, a law widely interpreted by eight Federal
circuit courts to mean that the 180 day time limit for filing a charge of discrimination
with the [EEOC] begins each time a discriminatory paycheck is received.").
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including each time wages, benefits, or other compensation is
103paid .... ," The Act allows employees to file timely claims of em-
ployment discrimination with the EEOC within 180 or 300 days of the
issuance of any paycheck that has been "infected" by a prior discrimi-
natory pay decision.14 The law's proponents claim that the Court in
Ledbetter "ignore [d] the realities of the average employment environ-
ment,"'' and that the law restores the "broad, remedial purpose [of
Title VII], to make persons whole for injuries suffered on account[]
of unlawful employment discrimination."'' 6 During legislative hear-
ing, its opponents maintained that passage of the bill would "make it
impossible for businesses to defend themselves against actions that
occurred years in the past," 17 "discourage the prompt investigation
and resolution of discrimination,"'' 8 and encourage future discrimina-
tion by creating an incentive for businesses to avoid hiring members
of protected classes.' 9
This Comment considers the Ledbetter decision in light of the
broad remedial purpose of Title VII and ultimately concludes that,
although the Court accurately characterized facially neutral pay struc-
tures applied in a discriminatory manner as outside the scope of the
continuing violation doctrine, the nature of wage discrimination
compels an equitable tolling of the limitations period. Specifically,
Congress should write a broad discovery rule into Title VII that would
apply to claims involving wage discrimination. ° Under this discovery
rule, the limitations period would toll until the plaintiff knew or
should have known (1) of the pay decision and (2) that the decision
may have been discriminatory. The plaintiff does not need to infer
the intention of his or her employer; however, the plaintiff must have
some notice that the pay decision could have been influenced by a
discriminatory motive. It would generally suffice under this standard
13 Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Public Law No. 111-2, § 3(A), 123 Stat. 5,
5-6 (2009).
14 153 CONG. REc. H8940-02, H8942 (2007) (statement of Rep. Miller) ("[E]very
discriminatory paycheck is a violation of the act.").
15 153 CONG. REc. E1746-02, E1746 (2007) (statement of Rep. Boyda).
16 153 CONG. REc. H9219-02, H9220 (2007) (statement of Rep. Hoyer).
17 153 CONG. REc. H8940-02, H8945 (2007) (statement of Rep. Wilson).
18 Id. at H8946 (statement of Rep. Biggert).
19 Id. at H8947 (statement of Rep. Bachmann) ("[W]omen may very well expe-
rience real discrimination in that they may find that future employers are reluctant
to hire them ....").
20 A discovery rule can act to "postpone[] the triggering of a limitations period
from the date of the injury to the date a plaintiff should reasonably have discovered
the injury." Adams v. CBS Broad., Inc., 61 F. App'x 285, 287 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing
Clark v. City of Braidwood, 318 F.3d 764, 767 (7th Cir. 2003)).
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for a plaintiff to know that he or she is getting paid less than his or
her co-workers. 1 While this standard has been adopted by some of
the lower courts,2 it is far from widely accepted.23
Part II of this Comment provides a summary of the Ledbetter deci-
sion and other pre-Ledbetter case law. It discusses the emergence of
the continuing violation theory, its relation to the paycheck accrual
rule, and the Court's prior treatment of wage discrimination. Part III
of this Comment demonstrates that the continuing violation doctrine
and paycheck accrual rule are not the proper means by which victims
of wage discrimination should receive special treatment, although the
unique circumstances accompanying such claims do merit some oth-
er sort of equitable advantage to plaintiffs. Specifically, Part III dis-
cusses the problems inherent in the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act. Part IV
examines the application of the discovery rule in employment dis-
crimination cases by the lower courts and proposes a discovery rule
amendment to Title VII as a sufficient yet modest response to the
problem of latent wage discrimination.
2 4
II. LEDBETTJER V. GOODYEAR:
THE REJECTION OF THE PAYCHECK ACCRUAL RULE
Lilly Ledbetter brought a claim against Goodyear, her employer,
claiming that discriminatory evaluations of her job performance, sev-
eral of which occurred outside the charging period, were affecting
her current salary.15 Ledbetter claimed that her current paychecks
"'carried forward' the effects of prior, uncharged discrimination deci-
sions. 2 6 In asserting her claim, Ledbetter relied on the continuing
violation doctrine, as well as the paycheck accrual rule. 7 Ledbetter
contended that, when read in unison, these doctrines allowed her to
assert her claim based upon the discriminatory acts that took place
21 See infra Part IV. The proposed standard is fact-intensive and must be applied
on a case-by-case basis.
See, e.g., Adams, 61 F. App'x at 287.
23 It is worth noting that many states have adopted their own statutes dealing with
discrimination in the workplace, many of which are strict liability statutes, thus pro-
viding plaintiffs with relief in many situations where Title VII may not apply. See, e.g.,
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 149, § 105A (West 2004).
24 In addition to Title VII, the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act amended the Age Discrimi-
nation in Employment Act of 1967, the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990, and
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. The discovery rule advocated by this Comment could
apply with equal force to each of these provisions. In light of the nature of Lilly
Ledbetter's claim, however, this Comment will only address Title VII.
25 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 624 (2007).
26 Id. at 625.
27 Id. at 633-37.
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outside of the charging period.2 8 The Court, however, held that the
paycheck accrual rule did not apply to facially nondiscriminatory and
neutrally applied pay structures and affirmed the denial of Ledbet-
ter's claim. 29 The Court's decision demonstrates how the broad ap-
plication of these doctrines could lead to future abuses and inequita-
ble decisions. This Comment, however, will illustrate how the
application of a robust discovery rule would provide plaintiffs such as
Lilly Ledbetter with an adequate remedy while still safeguarding the
integrity of Title VII.30
A. The Facts
Lilly Ledbetter was employed by Goodyear Tire and Rubber
Company for nearly twenty years, spanning from 1979 to 1998.31 In
July 1998, Ledbetter filed a charge with the EEOC, claiming sex dis-
crimination under Title VII.3 2 Goodyear's salary structure was based
upon supervisor evaluations, and Ledbetter claimed that some of her
supervisors had intentionally given her poor reviews because she was
a woman. Ledbetter alleged that she was paid less over the twenty
years of her employment because of these early reviews and that her
salary at the time of her early retirement was affected by these deci-
sions.34 Upon discovering that her supervisors may have discrimi-
nated against her when conducting her early reviews, Ledbetter in-
quired further and learned that she was the lowest paid manager at
Goodyear. After taking an early retirement, Ledbetter filed a
charge of discrimination with the EEOC.36
At trial, a jury found that Ledbetter had established a claim un-
der Title VII and awarded her backpay and damages.37 On appeal,
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit held that the Title
28 Id. at 621, 623.
29 Id.
3 See infra Part IV.
31 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 621.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 621-22.
M Id. at 622.
35 Ledbetter claims that she received an anonymous tip that she was being paid
less than her male counterparts. Justice Denied? The Implications of the Supreme Court's
Ledbetter v. Goodyear Employment Discrimination Decision: Hearing on H.R 2831 Before
the H. Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 110th Cong. 10 (2007) (statement of Lilly Ledbetter,
plaintiff in Ledbetter v. Goodyear, former Goodyear employee), available at http://fr
webgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=l 10_house-hearings&docid=f:3
5806.pdf.
Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 621.
37 Id.
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VII claim was time-barred because Ledbetter could not point to any
discriminatory act within the limitations period of 180 days from
when she brought her claim.38 While a jury had paired the pay deci-
sions that took place prior to the charging period but were still affect-
ing Ledbetter's pay to a discriminatory intent, the circuit court found
that there was no discriminatory intent attached to the only two pay
decisions that took place during the limitations period. 39 Ledbetter
filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, seeking review of the following
question: "Whether ... a plaintiff may bring an action under Title VII
... alleging illegal pay discrimination when the disparate pay is re-
ceived during the statutory limitations period, but is the result of in-
tentionally discriminatory pay decisions that occurred outside the li-
mitations period."4
B. Title VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 has been described as
"one of the most effective federal antidiscrimination statutes in em-
ployment discrimination law ... ,,4' The statute prohibits an employ-
er from discriminating "against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, be-
cause of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national ori-
gin. '' 4' Title VII also prohibits discrimination against employees be-
cause of their association with another who is a member of a
43protected class or as retaliation against employees who oppose un-
lawful discrimination." In order to invoke Title VII, an employee
must file a claim with the EEOC within 180 or 300 days of the alleged-
ly unlawful act, depending on whether the state has its own State Fair
Employment Practices Agency (FEPA) authorized to contest the chal-
lenged practice.49
Id. at 622-23.
39 Id. at 623.
40 Id.
41 Vincent Cheng, National Railroad Passenger Corporation v. Morgan: A Problematic
Formulation of the Continuing Violation Theoy, 91 CAL. L. REV. 1417, 1419 (2003).
42 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2000).
43 Parr v. Woodmen of the World Life Ins. Co., 791 F.2d 888, 892 (11th Cir.
1986) ("Where a plaintiff claims discrimination based upon an interracial marriage
or association, he alleges, by definition, that he has been discriminated against be-
cause of his race.") (emphasis in original).
44 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); see also Twisdale v. Snow, 325 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir.
2003).
45 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).
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Our courts have recognized two modes of discrimination that
are reprehensible under the Act: disparate treatment and disparate
impact. 46 Disparate treatment claims consist of an employment prac-
tice coupled with a discriminatory intent.47 Disparate impact claims
encompass employment practices that are not coupled with a discri-
minatory intent but nevertheless have a disparate effect "on one
group more than another and which cannot be justified by business
necessity. The majority of claims filed under Title VII are disparate
treatment claims. 49 Regardless of the type of claim, Title VII permits
a successful plaintiff to recover back pay for a period of up to two
years before the charge of discrimination was filed with the EEOC.50
As originally enacted, Title VII was targeted at the implementa-
tion of systematic practices of employment discrimination. As the
case law has developed, courts have generally interpreted Title VII as
encompassing a broad remedial purpose and have operated under
the presupposition that "[i] t is.. . the duty of the courts to make sure
that the Act works, and the intent of Congress is not hampered by a
combination of a strict construction of the statute and a battle with
semantics.0 2 To adhere to this broader purpose, the courts have de-
veloped common law doctrines allowing plaintiffs to toll the limita-
tions period and assert their claims in situations in which the alleged
discriminatory act may be hard to ascertain, is part of a continuing
policy, or requires a cumulative analysis.
46 Debra H. Goldstein, Sex-Based Wage Discrimination: Recovery Under the Equal Pay
Act, Title VII, or Both, 56 ALA. LAw. 294, 297 (1995).
47 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 624, 631 (2007).
48 Goldstein, supra note 46, at 297; see also Int'l Bd. of Teamsters v. U.S., 431 U.S.
324, 336 n.15 (1977) (explaining that disparate impact cases are based on "employ-
ment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that
in fact fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified by busi-
ness necessity").
49 Goldstein, supra note 46, at 298.
50 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1) (2000).
51 Cheng, supra note 41, at 1419 n.1.
52 Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970); see also
Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 661.
53 See generally Lex K. Larson, Part XX Title VII: Administrative Prerequisites to Court
Suit, 4-72 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 72.08 (2007). Larson explains the nature of
the continuing violation theory as follows:
The idea . . . is that the employer action, though outside of the time
period, is a part of a continuing policy or practice that continues to the
present .... Courts in recent times have endorsed the use of "continu-
ing violation" when there is an overt and continuing employer policy
or when there exists a hostile work environment of sexual or racial ha-
rassment. Some courts also recognized the applicability of continuing
violation theory when the plaintiff is subjected to a series of discrete
20091 COMMENT 1027
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C. The Majority Opinion
In an opinion authored by Justice Alito, the Court affirmed the
appellate court's denial of Ledbetter's claim. 54 The Court focused
specifically on the fact that Ledbetter's claim was one of disparate
treatment, which requires that the practice in question be coupled
with a discriminatory intent.5" The Court emphasized that Ledbetter
did not allege that the conduct that took place within the EEOC
charging period was coupled with discriminatory intent.56 Rather,
Ledbetter argued that the conduct that took place within the EEOC
charging period "carried forward" the discriminatory intent of con-
duct which was itself time-barred.57 Relying on precedent, the Court
held that "a pay-setting decision is a discrete act that occurs at a par-
ticular point in time., 58 The Court emphasized that discriminatory
intent associated with past discrete pay decisions could not carry for-
ward to timely discrete acts, unless those timely acts were themselves
discriminatory. 9 Because Ledbetter could not point to an actionable
offense within the limitations period, the Court denied her claim. °
but related employer violations, some but not all of which occur within
the filing deadline period.
Id.
Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 621.
55 Id. at 624.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 621.
59 Id. at 631-32; see also Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113
(2002). The Court stated this proposition clearly in Morgan, declaring that
discrete discriminatory acts ... are not actionable if time barred, even
when they are related to acts alleged in timely filed charges. Each dis-
crete discriminatory act starts a new clock for filing charges alleging
that act. The charge, therefore, must be filed within the 180- or 300-
day time period after the discrete discriminatory act occurred. The ex-
istence of past acts and the employee's prior knowledge of their occur-
rence, however, does not bar employees from filing charges about re-
lated discrete acts so long as the acts are independently discriminatory
and charges addressing those acts are themselves timely filed. Nor
does the statute bar an employee from using the prior acts as back-
ground evidence in support of a timely claim.
Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114. Ledbetter did not claim that the timely pay decisions or the
timely issuing of her paychecks were discriminatory on their own, but rather that
"the paychecks were unlawful because they would have been larger if she had been
evaluated in a nondiscriminatory manner prior to the EEOC charging period." Led-
better, 550 U.S. at 624 (citing Brief for Petitioner at 22). Similarly, she maintained
that "the 1998 decision was unlawful because it 'carried forward' the effects of prior,
unchanged discrimination decisions." Id. at 625 (citing Reply Brief for Petitioner at
20).
60 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 625-26.
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The Court's opinion provided a summary of the established
precedent in the area and drew analogies to Ledbetter's claim. The
Court first drew attention to United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans,6' which was
the Court's first main interpretation of the continuing violation
theory. The continuing violation theory has been described as "one
of the most confusing theories in employment discrimination law.
2
Generally, it "allows courts to . . .extend the limitations period so
that plaintiffs may recover in part based on defendants' discriminato-
ry conduct occurring before that period.,
63
The continuing violation theory may be invoked by plaintiffs
who claim they are presently feeling the effects of a discriminatory act
that took place outside of the limitations period,' such as plaintiffs
victimized by a hostile work environment that provides no specific
discrete act of discrimination but, when taken as a whole, culminates
65in a discriminatory practice. Often, the current discriminatory act
gives effect to the previous discrimination by providing the impetus
through which the victim is finally harmed by the prior discrimina-
tion.6 6 The theory is based upon the supposition that the defendant's
discriminatory acts that occurred prior to the limitations period are
"part of a continuing policy or practice that continues to the present,
and therefore constitutes a single actionable event."67  However, a
plaintiff can only invoke the continuing violation doctrine when a
timely discriminatory act exists.66 Succinctly stated, " [t] he continuing
violations doctrine . . .reflect[s] the recognition that discrimination
develops and burdens its victim over time and that it is often difficult
to discern until an extended pattern emerges., 69 In response to an
overzealous application of the continuing violation theory, however,
61 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
62 Thelma Crivens, The Continuing Violation Theory and Systemic Discrimination: In
Search of a judicial Standard for Timely Filing, 41 VMND. L. REV. 1171, 1172 (1988).
Cheng, supra note 41, at 1420.
King v. Ga. Power Co., 295 F. Supp. 943, 946 (N.D. Ga. 1968) ("The failure to
allege that the complaint was filed with the EEOC within 90 days of the alleged un-
fair employment practices is of no importance, for the violations of Title VII alleged
in the complaint may be construed as 'continuing' acts."); see also Larson, supra note
53, at § 72.08.
65 See Larson, supra note 53, at § 72.08.
66 Id.
67 Id.
68 See generally Bazemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986).
69 Deborah L. Brake & Joanna L. Grossman, The Failure of Title VII as a Rights-
Claiming System, 86 N.C. L. REV. 859, 870 (2008).
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both the Supreme Court and circuit courts have been slowly under-
70
cutting its power.
The Supreme Court first commented on the continuing viola-
tion doctrine in United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans1 in 1977 and, in doing
so, seriously limited its application. Evans involved a flight attendant
who was forced to resign because United Air Lines ("United") would
not employ a married flight attendant. 72 Evans did not immediately
file her claim with the EEOC, but waited until she was rehired in
1972, at which time United treated her as a new employee. 3 Evans
claimed that the discriminatory system United had employed caused
her to lose her seniority status.4 While the Court recognized that
United's seniority system gave present effect to a past discriminatory
act, 75 it concluded that Evans' claim was time-barred because no
present violation existed. 6 In so holding, the Court stated that
[a] discriminatory act which is not made the basis for a timely
charge is the legal equivalent of a discriminatory act which oc-
curred before the statute was passed. It may constitute relevant
background evidence in a proceeding in which the status of a cur-
rent practice is at issue, but separately considered, it is merely an
unfortunate event in history which has no present legal conse-
77quences.
The Court's application was substantially narrower than that of the
federal circuit court prior to this decision. 8 Plaintiffs could no long-
er breathe life into past discriminatory acts of which they continued
to feel the effects unless they could point to a present violation of the
70 Matthew Sutter, Title VII & the ADA's Continuing Violation Theary and the Single
Filing Rule: A Guide to How to "Bootstrap" and "Piggyback" Stale Claims onto Fresh Ones, 23
QUINNIPIAC L. REv. 299, 320 (2004). Sutter commented on the continual retreat of
the continuing violation theory by stating:
[S]ince the announcement of the hostile work environment and the
paycheck approach, the Supreme Court and other lower courts have
been curbing the application of the continuing violation theory. Mod-
ernly, the continuing violation theory requires that the claimant tie to-
gether numerous instances of adverse treatment into a narrative of es-
calating harm-thereby limiting the theory's applicability to many
claimants.
Id. at 320.
71 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
72 Id. at 554.
73 Id. at 555. United had rescinded its no-marriage policy in 1968. Id.
74 Id.
75 Id. at 557.
76 Id. at 558.
77 Evans, 431 U.S. at 558.
See generally Larson, supra note 53.
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statute or one which occurred during the limitations period.79 The
requirement of a present violation is now central to the continuing
violation theory.""
In his Ledbetter opinion, Justice Alito stated that the Court in
Evans had "rejected an argument that is basically the same as Ledbet-
ter's..''. According to Justice Alito, Evans made it clear that a present
violation must exist in order to invoke the continuing violation
theory 2 and that the Court could not impute the discriminatory in-
tent of a previous act upon a subsequent impartial decision. The
Court posited that the "relationship between past discrimination and
adverse present effects was the same in Evans as it is here."'84 Applying
this reasoning to Ledbetter's claim, the Court observed that the prior
decisions were not actionable simply because their effects continued
into the charging period. 85 The Court recognized that it could not
attach the discriminatory intent associated with the decisions that
were made beyond the reach of the charging period to subsequent
acts; without a present discriminatory intent, Ledbetter's claim did
not constitute a continuing violation.
6
The Ledbetter Court also relied on Delaware State College v. Ricks.
8 7
Ricks dealt with a college's allegedly discriminatory decision to deny
an African American professor tenure."" The reasoning of this case,
as in Evans, focused on the time of the actual discriminatory act, as
opposed to when the plaintiff felt the effects of the discrimination.'9
Ricks, who had gained knowledge of the college's decision to deny
him tenure in 1974, filed his claim with the EEOC over a year later.9°
Ricks asserted that his claim was not time-barred because it was filed
79 Evans, 431 U.S. at 558.
80 See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
81 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 625 (2007).
82 Id. at 625-66.
83 Id. at 629.
84 Id. at 637.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 626 (discussing Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250
(1980)).
88 Ricks, 449 U.S. at 257.
89 Id. at 258 (noting that "[t]he proper focus is upon the time of the discrimina-
tory acts, not upon the time at which the consequences of the acts became most
painful" (quoting Abramson v. Univ. of Haw., 594 F.2d 202, 209 (1979) (emphasis
omitted))).
90 Id. at 258.
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within 180 days of the termination of his employment when he first
began to feel the effects of the discriminatory decision. 9
The Court posited that the limitations period began to run when
Ricks learned of the discriminatory decision, not a year later when his
employment ended as a result of the school's refusal of his tenure.
92
The Court did not allow Ricks to invoke the continuing violation
theory because he could not identify any specific discriminatory act
"that continued until, or occurred at the time of, the actual termina-
tion of his employment."93  Ricks was terminated because his non-
renewable contract had expired.94 In accordance with Evans, the
Ricks Court "did not take the discriminatory intent that the college
allegedly possessed when it denied Ricks tenure and attach that in-
tent to its subsequent act of terminating his employment., 95 Evans
and Ricks, when read together, make clear that the present effects of
discrimination that took place beyond the limitations period are not
actionable. 
9 6
Justice Alito next discussed the landmark decision of National
Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan.9 7 In Morgan, a former employee of
Amtrak claimed "he ha[d] been subjected to discrete discriminatory
and retaliatory acts and had experienced a racially hostile work envi-
ronment throughout his employment."" Most of the discriminatory
conduct took place outside of the reach of the limitations period. 99
While the Court recognized that hostile work environment claims
merited application of the continuing violation theory, the Court dis-
tinguished such claims from those alleging discrete discriminatory
and retaliatory acts.1 00
Writing for the majority, Justice Thomas reasoned that while dis-
crete acts were "easy to identify[J,] . . . [the] very nature [of hostile
work environment claims] involves repeated conduct,"'9 ' and "is
comprised of a series of separate acts that collectively constitute one
91 Id.
92 Id. at 259.
93 Id. at 257.
94 Ricks, 449 U.S. at 257.
95 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 629 (2007).
9 Cheng, supra note 41, at 1421 n.ll.
97 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 628 (discussing Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536
U.S. 101 (2002)).
98 Morgan, 536 U.S. at 104.
9 Id. at 105.
10 Id. at 122.
101 Id. at 114-15.
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'unlawful employment practice.' 10 2 In so holding, the Court imple-
mented a new standard based on whether the alleged discriminatory
actions were "discrete," such as "termination, failure to promote,
denial of transfer, or refusal to hire."10' 3 These discrete acts now were
actionable only so far as they took place within the limitations period,
regardless of the continuity of discrimination beyond the period. 
0 4
In a concurring opinion, Justice O'Connor posited that discrete
claims should contain a notice requirement. 115 Unlike the notice
condition in Ricks,'06 this requirement would act to extend the limita-
tions period for plaintiffs who did not have notice of their employers'
discrete acts of discrimination. 0 7 While the Court emphasized the
importance of the characterization of the alleged discriminatory ac-
tions, it did not provide a concrete definition of "discrete."
Applying the Morgan framework, the Ledbetter Court held that "a
pay-setting decision is a discrete act that occurs at a particular point
in time."'0 8 The Court focused on the fact that Ledbetter "ma[de] no
claim that intentionally discriminatory conduct occurred during the
charging period or that discriminatory decisions that occurred prior
to that period were not communicated to her."'' 9  The Court rea-
soned, however, that Ledbetter should have brought a claim in a
timely fashion after the pay decisions were made. "0 While the Court
gave proper effect to the precedent delineating the continuing viola-
tion theory, it referenced Ledbetter's failure to allege insufficient
knowledge about the original decisions."' Ledbetter stood solely on
the grounds that the "conduct during the charging period gave
present effect to discriminatory conduct outside of that period.""1
2
The Court's continual reference to Ledbetter's failure to assert some
other justification for her late filing leaves open a window for later in-
vestigation into the properness of the current discovery rule. Ledbet-
ter's reliance on the continuing violation theory, however, drew the
majority of its influence from Bazemore v. Friday, a case in which the
102 Id. at 117.
1o3 Id. at 114.
104 Morgan, 536 U.S. at 122.
105 Id. (O'Connor, J, concurring).
106 See supra notes 86-95 and accompanying text.
107 Morgan, 536 U.S. at 124 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
108 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 621, 628-29 (2007).
109 Id. at 628.
110 Id.
II' Id.
112 Id.
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theory was applied directly to wage discrimination and which devel-
oped the "pay-check accrual rule.""1
3
Bazemore v. Friday"4 involved an employer that had segregated its
employees into "white" and "Negro" branches, systematically paying
the African American employees less than their Caucasian counter-
parts. 5 In response to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
the company merged the two divisions but never resolved the dispari-
ties that were sharply demarcated along racial lines.16 In a per cu-
riam opinion, the Supreme Court overturned the decision of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, which held
that the company had no affirmative duty to correct the disparities in
pay, as the disparities originated before Title VII became applicable
to public employees, and the claims were therefore time-barred. 17
To invoke Title VII, the Court had to point to a present violation
in accordance with Evans and Ricks.18 As Justice Brennan stated in
his concurring opinion, "[e]ach week's paycheck that delivers less to
a black than to a similarly situated white is a wrong actionable under
Title VII, regardless of the fact that this pattern was begun prior to
the effective date of Tide VII."" 9 This succinct statement provided
the Court's most straightforward interpretation in the area of contin-
uing violation to date and was generally interpreted by lower courts
to mean that the limitations period could be tolled by every paycheck
received that reflected an alleged discriminatory practice. 120
113 Id. at 633.
'1 478 U.S. 385 (1986) (per curiam).
15 Id. at 390-91 (Brennan,J., concurring).
116 Id.
"7 Id. at 394 ("The Court of Appeals reasoned that the Extension Service was un-
der no obligation to eliminate any salary disparity between blacks and whites that had
its origin prior to 1972 when Title VII became applicable to public employees such as
the Extension Service."); see also id. at 394 n.5 ("As originally enacted, Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 applied only to private employers. The Act was expanded to
include public employees by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 86
Stat. 103, whose effective date was March 24, 1972." (citing 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(a),
(b), (f), (h) (1972))).
'18 See supra text accompanying note 96.
119 Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 395-96. The Court distinguished Bazemore from Evans
factually by pointing out that the employer in Evans had discontinued its discrimina-
to 7 practice, while the employer in Bazemore had not. Id. at 396 n.6.
See, e.g., Goodwin v. Gen. Motors Corp., 275 F.3d 1005, 1011 (10th Cir. 2002)
(holding that plaintiffs claim was timely as each paycheck received that was affected
by the racially discriminatory decision amounted to a violation of Title VII); Carde-
nas v. Massey, 269 F.3d 251, 257-58 (3d Cir. 2001) (holding that the employee's
claim was not time-barred, even though it was brought more than 180 days beyond
the discriminatory pay decision, because he had received a paycheck that was af-
fected by the discriminatory decision within the limitations period); Calloway v. Part-
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Bazemore stood for the proposition that the payment of compen-
sation that was limited by a discriminatory decision was in itself an ac-
tionable violation of Title VII. 121 This actionable violation could then
breathe life into the prior discriminatory decision due to the continu-
ing violation theory.121 In the aftermath of Bazemore, however, the
Court pulled in the reins on the continuing violation theory by fre-
quently distinguishing subsequent cases from Bazemore. 1
23
The majority opinion in Ledbetter distinguished Bazemore by em-
phasizing that the pay structures in Bazemore were themselves facially
discriminatory and therefore constituted present violations of Title
VII.12 Justice Alito posited that each paycheck associated with pay
structures that intentionally subvert a suspect class must be treated as
violations of Title VII because "an employer that adopts and inten-
tionally retains such a pay structure can surely be regarded as intend-
ing to discriminate on the basis of race as long as the structure is
used." 2 5 In so holding, the Court limited the paycheck accrual rule,
established in Bazemore, to pay structures that are themselves discri-
minatory, excluding neutral policies which have been applied in a
discriminatory manner. 2 6 Ledbetter, therefore, could not rely on Ba-
zemore, as she did not allege that Goodyear's pay system was adopted
"in order to discriminate on the basis of sex." 2 7 The paycheck ac-
crual rule was of no use to Ledbetter, and her claim was therefore
deemed untimely. 
28
The majority opinion outlined the current interpretation of the
continuing violation theory and provided sound reasons for limiting
its application. The Court did not, however, provide sound policy
reasons for turning away other methods of expanding the scope of
ners Nat'l Health Plans, 986 F.2d 446, 449 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that "race
based, discriminatory wage payments constitute a continuing violation of Title VII").
121 Bazemore, 478 U.S. at 395-96.
122 Id.
123 See Florida v. Long, 487 U.S. 223, 239 (1988) (holding that the receipt of
checks in connection with a retirement benefits program based on a discriminatory
decision did not invoke the continuing violation theory). The Court distinguished
Bazemore on the grounds that the Bazemore case dealt with wages which were being
provided for current work, as opposed to past work, and that such a payroll is not
funded on an actuarial basis, as a retirement plan is. Id. The Court also noted that
application of the continuing violation theory to a retirement plan would cause em-
ployers to be liable for conduct far in the past. Id. at 238; see also Lorance v. AT&T
Tech., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 913 n.3 (1989).
124 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 634-36 (2007).
125 Id. at 634.
126 Id. at 627, 636.
127 Id. at 637.
128 Id.
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Tide VII to claims such as Ledbetter's.'9 In her dissent, Justice Gins-
burg attacked both the majority's interpretation of the relevant
precedent as well as its unwillingness to consider the realities accom-
panying wage discrimination." 0 While Justice Ginsburg's discussion
of Bazemore and Morgan do little to challenge the interpretation of the
majority, her insight into the nature of wage discrimination and the
realities of the workplace indicate a need to develop a mechanism
which would set claims of wage discrimination aside and provide em-
ployees facing these sorts of claims leeway when dealing with the limi-
tations period.
D. Ginsburg's Dissent
In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg characterized the majority's in-
terpretation of Title VII as "cramped" and stated that it was "incom-
patible with the statute's broad remedial purpose.''. Justice Gins-
burg's insight into the true nature of wage discrimination and the
"realities of the workplace" 32 provided the impetus leading to a con-
129 Id. at 642.
We are not in a position to evaluate Ledbetter's policy arguments, and
it is not our prerogative to change the way in which Title VII balances
the interests of aggrieved employees against the interest in encourag-
ing the prompt processing of all charges of employment discrimina-
tion, and the interest in repose.
Id. (citation omitted).
130 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 645 (GinsburgJ., dissenting).
'3' Id. at 661.
132 Id. at 645-46. Ginsburg commented on how the realities of the workplace
create gaps of knowledge which lead to unchecked wage discrimination and victims
with untenable claims:
It is not unusual, decisions in point illustrate, for management to de-
cline to publish employee pay levels, or for employees to keep private
their own salaries .... The problem of concealed pay discrimination is
particularly acute where the disparity arises not because the female
employee is flatly denied a raise but because male counterparts are giv-
en larger raises. Having received a pay increase, the female employee
is unlikely to discern at once that she has experienced an adverse em-
ployment decision. She may have little reason even to suspect discrim-
ination until a pattern develops incrementally and she ultimately be-
comes aware of the disparity. Even if an employee suspects that the
reason for a comparatively low raise is not performance but sex (or
another protected ground), the amount involved may seem too small,
or the employer's intent too ambiguous, to make the issue immediately
actionable--or winnable.
Id. at 649-50.
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gressional response intended to reinstate the paycheck accrual rule as
it was interpreted prior to Ledbetter.'3
As Justice Ginsburg explained, employers do not generally pub-
licize disparities in their employees' salaries.3 4 As discussed above,
the inherent difference between Ledbetter's claim and the discrete
acts identified in Morgan is the ability of the aggrieved plaintiff to ac-
curately recognize such injustice.3 5 The inability of employees to
identify an employer's wage discrimination is not unique to Ledbet-
ter's situation.3 6 AsJustice Ginsburg explained:
Pay disparities are thus significantly different from adverse actions
"such as termination, failure to promote, . . . or refusal to hire,"
all involving fully communicated discrete acts, "easy to identify" as
discriminatory.... It is only when the disparity becomes apparent
and sizable, e.g., through future raises calculated as a percentage
of current salaries, that an employee in Ledbetter's situation is
likely to comprehend her plight and, therefore, to complain. Her
initial readiness to give her employer the benefit of the doubt
should not preclude her from later challenging the then current
and continuing payment of a wage depressed on account of her
137
sex.
According to Justice Ginsburg, the current framework adopted by the
Court allows "[a]ny annual pay decision not contested immediately
... [to] become[] grandfathered, a fait accompli beyond the province
of Title VII ever to repair."' Such a result allows discrimination to
continue in ways the drafters of Title VII did not foresee. 139 While the
Court recognizes that discriminatory pay structures cannot escape
133 See generally Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Public Law No. 111-2, 123 Stat.
5 (2009).
134 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 649-50 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also 153 CONG. REC.
H8940, H8950 (2007) (statement of Rep. Loebsack). Rep. Loebsack also com-
mented on the inherent notice problem accompanying wage discrimination:
Employees often don't know about a discriminatory decision until it is
too late. Pay disparities are difficult to discern. Many employers pro-
hibit employees from discussing their salaries, and workplace norms
warn against asking coworkers about their salaries. Additionally, a mi-
nor pay disparity adopted for discriminatory reasons in the beginning
of a career may go unnoticed until, years later, after subsequent per-
centile adjustments, it is too large to ignore.
Id.
I135 See supra text accompanying notes 97-113.
M See generally Brake & Grossman, supra note 69.
137 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 645 (GinsbergJ., dissenting) (citations omitted).
13s Id. at 644.
139 Id.; see also supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
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judicial review, 140 it distinguishes facially neutral pay structures that
are applied in a discriminatory manner."' However, the aggrieved
employees suffering from wage disparities suffer the same harm re-
gardless of this distinction. The fact that most employees are not giv-
en sufficient access to information to decipher when wage discrimi-
nation has taken place compels different treatment of such cases by
the Court. 42 In her dissenting opinion, Justice Ginsburg called upon
the legislature to correct this injustice, 43 and in recognition of her
plea, Congress drafted the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.
44
E. The Ledbetter Fair Pay Act
In response to the Court's holding in Ledbetter, the House of
Representatives drafted the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2007. 145 Despite
early opposition, the Senate's version of the bill eventually made it
through both legislative houses, and was signed into law by President
Barack Obama on January 29, 2009. ' The law acts to reinstate the
paycheck accrual rule, such that every paycheck infected with a prior
discriminatory decision now constitutes an unlawful employment
practice. 47 The law states:
140 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 637 ("Bazemore stands for the proposition that an employer
violates Title VII and triggers a new EEOC charging period whenever the employer
issues paychecks using a discriminatory pay structure.").
141 Id.
142 Bierman & Gely, supra note 7, at 168. Bierman and Gely's studies support the
conclusion that most employees are not given sufficient access to information to de-
cipher when wage discrimination has taken place:
[W]hile discussion of financial matters is often acceptable in some
parts of the world, it is generally considered "crass" in the United
States. In short, discussion by individuals of their salaries and related
matters can be seen as violating an American "social norm." One-third
of United States private sector employers have reinforced this norm by
adopting specific rules prohibiting employees from discussing their
wages with co-workers, rules known as pay secrecy/confidentiality
("PSC") rules. Moreover, legal and human resource management ex-
perts recognize that in addition to workplaces with specific PSC rules, a
significant number of other employers have more informal expecta-
tions that employees "keep their lips sealed about their salaries."
Id. (citations omitted).
143 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 661 (Ginsburg,J., dissenting).
144 See generally Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Public Law No. 111-2, 123 Stat.
5 (2009).
145 Seeid. § 2(a).
146 See id; see Rachel Weiner, Lilly Ledbetter Act; Obama Signs His First Bill, Jan.
29, 2009, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/01 /27/lily-ledbetter-act-the-fi n 6
1423.html.
147 See id. § 3(A).
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For purposes of this section, an unlawful employment practice
occurs, with respect to discrimination in compensation in viola-
tion of this title, when a discriminatory compensation decision or
other practice is adopted, when an individual becomes subject to
a discriminatory compensation decision or other practice, or
when an individual is affected by application of a discriminatory
compensation decision or other practice, including each time
wages, benefits, or other compensation is paid, resulting in whole
or in part from such a decision or other practice. 148
The law essentially nullifies the Court's holding in Ledbetter and allows
plaintiffs suffering from latent wage discrimination under facially
neutral pay structures the full protection of Title VII.14 9 The law im-
putes the discriminatory motives of past decisions to the current act
of tendering wages, thereby reinstating the paycheck accrual rule as it
was interpreted at the appellate level before Ledbetter.50
III. CONGRESS'S MISAPPLICATION OF THE PAYCHECK ACCRUAL
RULE AND THE NEED FOR A BROAD DISCOVERY RULE
As Congress recognized, the practical effect of the Ledbetter
Court's holding was to place an undue burden on plaintiffs asserting
claims of wage discrimination. 151 In the wake of the Court's rejection
of the paycheck accrual rule, victims of wage discrimination were un-
able to bring their claims unless they had learned of their employer's
discriminatory intent within the short limitations period. As Justice
Ginsburg noted, the realities of the workplace exacerbate this prob-
lem, as the vast majority of employees do not have access to informa-
tion regarding their wage decisions and, therefore, would be unable
to bring Title VII claims if they subsequently learned of their employ-
er's discriminatory intent. 152
In support of its decision, however, the Court provided sound
reasons for denying the application of the continuing violations doc-
trine and for applying the limitations period in a strict manner. The
Court conducted a sensible analysis of the continuing violations
theory and accurately stated that imputing the discriminatory intent
of past decisions to current "neutral" acts would improperly distort
1 Id. §6.
149 See id.
150 See supra notes 121-28.
151 See 153 CONG. REc. E1746, E1746 (2007) (statement of Rep. Boyda); 153 CONG.
REc. H9219, H9220 (2007) (statement of Rep. Hoyer).
152 See Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 654-56 (2007)
(GinsburgJ., dissenting).
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the nature of the theory.5 The Court also pointed out that statutes
of limitations "represent a pervasive legislative judgment that it is un-
just to fail to put the adversary on notice to defend within a specified
period of time and that 'the right to be free of stale claims in time
comes to prevail over the right to prosecute them."" 4 While the 180-
day time limit Congress placed on claims under Title VII evinces a
motive to promote the swift resolution of claims, Title VII's progeny
of case law provides ample evidence that Congress's intent was to pro-
tect against discrimination whenever possible.15  Congress, however,
must recognize the need to prevent the filing of stale claims and must
balance the equities in order to discover where the judicial scales shift
away from righting discriminatory wrongs and towards protecting
"employers from the burden of defending claims arising from em-
ployment decisions that are long past.""1
56
A. The Ledbetter Fair Pay Act: An Overzealous Congressional Response
Although a narrow application of the statute of limitations may
preclude the adjudication of legitimate claims of wage discrimina-
tion, the implementation of the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act will distort the
nature of the continuing violation theory. As the majority stated in
Ledbetter, the continuing violation theory does not toll the limitations
period, but rather allows plaintiffs to include related acts to amass a
Title VII claim.'57 A present violation must exist in order to gather
together other related acts. 15 Wage discrimination, within the con-
text of a facially neutral compensation system, lacks the requisite in-
tent to form a present violation. The continuing violations theory al-
lows plaintiffs to amass discriminatory acts that are significantly
related because they accumulate to form a single claim.' 59 The theory
is based, however, upon the continual presence of discriminatory in-
tent. 1'0 It is this discriminatory intent that provides the plaintiff with
an actionable offense under Title VII.' 6' As the Ledbetter Court noted,
applying the paycheck accrual rule to facially nondiscriminatory pay
systems would require an attachment of the discriminatory intent of
153 Id. at 629-30; see infra text accompanying notes 157-63.
154 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 630 (quoting United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117
(1979) (internal citation omitted)).
:55 See supra Part 11.
56 Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 256-57 (1980).
157 See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
1 See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
:59 See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
60 See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text.
161 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 631 (2007).
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prior acts to subsequent "neutral" acts. 62 Such an imputing of dis-
criminatory intent would attach liability to a nondiscriminatory act,
and would constitute an improper application of the continuing vi-
olation theory, as the continuing violation theory comprises the con-
tinuation of discriminatory intent.' 63 Wage discrimination is not cu-
mulative in this sense, as no present discriminatory intent exists. The
continuing violation theory, therefore, should not apply to latent
wage discrimination, and the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act provides an un-
merited and overzealous response to Ledbetter.
Although wage discrimination does not fulfill the elements of a
continuing violation, the practical effect of the Ledbetter decision is to
prevent victims of wage discrimination from bringing their claims.
While Congress should step in to remedy this problem, the Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act provides an inequitable solution, not only because it will
overstretch the continuing violations doctrine, but for several policy
reasons as well.
Allowing employees to assert their claims within 180 or 300 days
of when any compensation is paid, regardless of the presence of a
discriminatory intent, may "discourage the prompt investigation and
resolution of discrimination," and would overlook the sound policy
for implementing stringent limitations. Permitting the statute to
toll in the manner proposed will allow employees to bring their
claims years after the alleged discrimination took place, and may al-
low situations in which employers would lose the means necessary to
defend themselves from such claims. 165 The passage of this legislation
will result in the shifting of an unjust burden from victims of past dis-
crimination to employers who may not be able to defend themselves
from stale claims. As this Comment advocates, the tolling of the sta-
tute for equitable purposes through the implementation of a discov-
ery rule, instead of an extension of the continuing violations theory,
would suffice to allow aggrieved plaintiffs to assert their claims, as
well as to allow businesses an avenue for the swift resolution of
claims. 166
The legislation signed into law by President Obama allows em-
ployees to file suit in a timely fashion when they are "affected by ap-
162 Id. at 629.
163 See supra notes 64-70 and accompanying text. Hostile work environment
claims, for example, invoke the application of the continuing violation doctrine be-
cause all of the acts upon which liability can be based harbor discriminatory intent.
164 153 CONG. REC. H8940, H8946 (2007) (statement of Rep. Biggert).
165 Id. (statement of Rep. Fox).
166 See infra Part IV.
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plication of a discriminatory compensation decision or other prac-
tice."' 167 While Title VII must be applied broadly in order to serve its
purpose, this law will allow plaintiffs to bring their claims years after
they were notified of a previously undisclosed discriminatory pay de-
cision. While most plaintiffs would not passively sit on their rights,
allowing them this leisure may lead to stale claims in which employers
would be unable to unearth any sufficient evidence defending their
policy. The law will also act to discourage employers from addressing
such issues with their employees, as they would hold nothing to gain
by bringing any discriminatory decisions to light. If Congress were to
redraft this legislation and advocate a bold discovery rule, employers
might seek to redress these problems on their own, as they could lim-
it their potential liability by beginning the tolling of the charging pe-
riod at a set time, rather than with each subsequent pay check. 1'8
Furthermore, allowing such treatment of "other practices" may
allow plaintiffs who are the victims of truly discrete discriminatory
acts-such as termination, 169 failure to promote, or denial of trans-
fer-to reserve the right to assert their claims years into the future,
essentially holding their employers at ransom. For example, applying
this legislation to Ricks would have resulted in a timely claim, despite
the fact that Ricks knew of the discriminatory practice all along. 170 In
addition, during his presidential tenure, President Bush acknowl-
edged the problems inherent in applying this standard to "other
practices," and claimed that this legislation "could effectively waive
the statute of limitations for a wide variety of claims.., traditionally
regarded as actionable only when they occur."'171 In fact, President
Bush's threatened veto may have halted the progress of this bill dur-
ing his presidency.
67 See Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Public Law No. 111-2, § 3, 123 Stat. 5,
5-6 (2009)
168 See infra Part IV.
169 Employees receiving pensions or other forms of compensation post-
termination may be able to toll their claims in accordance with this Act.
170 Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 258 (1980).
171 Statement of Administration Policy: H.R. 2831 - Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of
2007, George W. Bush (July 27, 2007), available at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/
ws/index.php?pid=75621.
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B. Latent Wage Discrimination: The Need for a New Standard
Although a proper analysis of the continuing violations theory
precludes its application to latent wage discrimination, 172 the Ledbetter
opinion indicates the need for making a corrective measure available
to victims of wage discrimination. The Court overlooked several
points which support the conclusion that denying Ledbetter and oth-
er similarly situated plaintiffs some form of an equitable tolling of the
limitations period procures an unjust result.
For example, the Court based its reasoning upon the factual si-
milarities of Ledbetter's and Evans' claims. 173 The Court, however,
failed to acknowledge the obvious differences between the two
claims. Evans was aware of the discriminatory decision the day it was
made and had ample opportunity to bring her Title VII claim
through the proper channels. 74 Ledbetter, on the other hand, had
no knowledge of the discriminatory evaluations until years after they
took place. 175 Ledbetter knew that the evaluations took place, but she
did not know that her pay was negatively affected as a result, or that
her co-workers were receiving better compensation for doing the
same job.176 Ledbetter knew of the act, but not of the injury.
177
Ledbetter's ignorance of the discriminatory decisions did not
stem from her own malfeasance or indolence, but rather from the na-
ture of pay decisions themselves. As Justice Ginsburg articulated in
her dissent, discrimination of the nature that Ledbetter suffered is
not "easy to identify" as "compensation disparities ... are often hid-
den from sight."'17  Goodyear kept the relevant salary information
confidential, making it difficult for Ledbetter "to discern at once that
she ha[d] experienced an adverse employment decision. "179 While it
makes sense to deny Evans the protection of Tide VII because she
knew of her employer's discriminatory decisions and chose not to act
in a timely fashion, it defies reason to deny Ledbetter the protection
of Title VII, as she had no analogous choice. In other words, while
the Evans Court's denial of the application of the continuing viola-
172 In the context of facially neutral pay systems, Bazemore solidifies the application
of the continuing violations doctrine to facially discriminatory pay systems. See Ba-
zemore v. Friday, 478 U.S. 385 (1986) (per curiam).
173 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 625-26 (2007).
174 United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 554-55 (1977).
175 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 621.
176 See id.
177 See id.
178 Id. at 649.
179 Id. at 650.
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tion theory is ingrained in a sense of fairness, the Ledbetter Court's
denial produces an inherently unjust result. This blatant factual dis-
parity between Ledbetter and Evans evidences the need to carve out an
exception for victims of latent wage discrimination.
In addition, the Ledbetter Court failed to acknowledge a funda-
mental principal of Ricks. Ricks evidenced the importance of the em-
ployee's notice of the discriminatory decision."0 The Ricks Court
recognized that the time at which the employee learned of the dis-
criminatory decision affected the tolling of the charging period.'
While the Court did not draw on this notion any further, Ricks sup-
ports the idea that the tolling of the charging period should some-
how reflect the employee's knowledge of the discrimination.
While the expansion of the continuing violation theory may
swing the pendulum too far from center, the broad application of a
discovery rule would provide remedial measures for those aggrieved
as well as protect the sanctity of the statute of limitations.' The re-
mainder of this Comment will focus on the current application of the
discovery rule and the need for its expansion.
IV. BALANCING INTERESTS: A BROAD DISCOVERY RULE
FOR VICTIMS OF WAGE DISCRIMINATION
To provide victims of wage discrimination the opportunity to
bring their claims without overextending the continuing violation
theory, Congress should draft new legislation repealing the Ledbetter
Fair Pay Act and initiating a mandatory and broad discovery rule into
Title VII. The rule should state that in the case of wage discrimina-
tion, 's the limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff knew
or should have known that the adverse pay decision may have been
discriminatory. A more robust discovery rule makes sense in light of
the Supreme Court's precedent and the congressional intent to apply
Tide VII broadly. Such a rule would take into account the realities of
180 Del. State Coll. v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 256 (1980). In its later decision in Mor-
gan, the Court clarified that even though an employee gained knowledge of a dis-
criminatory decision which negatively affected his or her employment, subsequent
discriminatory acts occurring beyond the limitations period could breathe life back
into those prior acts if the acts were part of a continuing hostile work environment.
Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 118 (2002). Justice O'Connor
also recognized the need for a notice provision in her concurring opinion. Id. at 122
(O'Connor,J., concurring).
181 Ricks, 449 U.S. at 256.
82 See infra Part IV.
83 Congress would have to define the term "wage discrimination." The definition
would have to encompass discrimination manifesting itself in the form of a wage dis-
crepancy.
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the workplace, which often hides information from employees that
would shed light on possible wage discrimination. While the Ledbet-
ter Fair Pay Act accomplishes the same goal, it does so by mutilating
the continuing violation theory. In addition, a more robust discovery
rule would provide a more concrete point from which to toll the limi-
tations period14 and would allow the filing of fewer stale claims than
the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.
A. Current Application of the Discovery Rule
When discussing limitations periods, the federal courts have
generally recognized that "[a] cause of action accrues . . . when the
plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury which is the basis
of the action."'85  This doctrine, often referred to as the discovery
rule, could provide a plaintiff who has been denied the application of
the continuing violation doctrine the opportunity to recover damages
for pay inequity stemming from discrimination taking place beyond
the charging period. The Court first recognized the existence of the
discovery rule in the context of a Title VII claim in Zipes v. Trans
World Airlines, Inc.18 by holding that "a timely charge of discrimina-
tion with the EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in fed-
eral court, but a requirement that, like a statute of limitations, is sub-
ject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tolling."'87 While waiver and
estoppel apply to situations in which an employer has actively con-
cealed information from the employee, the discovery rule and the
doctrine of equitable tolling cover a far wider scope of events.',
184 Admittedly, determining exactly when an employee learns or should have
learned of information evincing a discriminatory motive may cause challenges. Such
challenges, however, are worth undertaking in light of the current inequity sur-
rounding wage discrimination.
1 Molina-Acosta v. Martinez, 392 F. Supp. 2d 210, 218 (D.P.R. 2005).
186 455 U.S. 385 (1982).
187 Id. at 393.
1 Note, Equitable Modification of Title VII Time Limitations to Promote the Statute's Re-
medial Nature: The Case for Maximum Application of the Zipes Rationale, 18 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 749, 779 (1985); see also Larson, supra note 53, § 72.06. Larson clarified the dif-
ference between estoppel and tolling:
Some courts seem to draw no distinction between equitable tolling and
estoppel, requiring design or action on the part of the employer to de-
lay the filing as a prerequisite to equitable tolling as it is with estoppel.
The Eleventh Circuit's decision in an ADEA action, Cocke v. Merrill
Lynch & Co., is instructive as to the difference between equitable es-
toppel and equitable tolling.... The court noted that equitable estoppel
was appropriate only when the employer had engaged in fraud or oth-
er misconduct, but that equitable tolling was warranted whenever an
employee with "a reasonably prudent regard for his rights" would be
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Although the Court recognized the application of these doc-
trines in Zipes, it has never discussed the discovery rule in depth in
the context of Title VII. 189 When presented with situations ripe for
the discussion of the discovery rule, the Court has generally resisted
and reserved the issue for later debate.1 90 Since Zipes, the Court has
recognized that the "time period for filing a charge is subject to
equitable doctrines such as tolling or estoppel,"' 9' but has merely
commented that such doctrines "are to be applied sparingly."' 192 Nev-
ertheless, the Court has refrained from clearly defining the bounda-
ries of the discovery rule. 93 In the wake of Morgan and Ledbetter, the
federal case law discussing the discovery rule in the context of Title
VII has been both inconsistent and unpredictable. 1
9 4
Ignoring the presence of the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, the current
application of the discovery rule in unison with the Ledbetter Court's
holding unduly hinders the ability of plaintiffs to recover for the inju-
rious conduct of their employers. Specifically, the current framework
justified in relying on the employer's good faith efforts to find him
another job.
Id.
189 See Brake & Grossman, supra note 69, at 874, 876.
0 See, e.g., Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 818 n.22 (1980).
191 Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 113 (2002); see also Zipes v.
TWA, 455 U.S. 385, 393 (1982) ("[F]iling a timely charge of discrimination with the
EEOC is not a jurisdictional prerequisite to suit in federal court, but a requirement
that, like a statute of limitations, is subject to waiver, estoppel, and equitable tol-
lin .).
Morgan, 536 U.S. at 113; see also Irwin v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89,
96 (1990) (although Irwin has been questioned by later courts, the controversy cen-
ters around the Court's creation of a rebuttable presumption for equitable tolling in
suits against the government, and is unrelated to the Court's discussion of the gener-
al application of equitable tolling). The Irwin Court recognized the rareness of the
application of the equitable tolling doctrine:
But an examination of the cases in which we have applied the equitable
tolling doctrine as between private litigants affords petitioner little
help. Federal courts have typically extended equitable relief only spa-
ringly. We have allowed equitable tolling in situations where the clai-
mant has actively pursued his judicial remedies by filing a defective
pleading during the statutory period, or where the complainant has
been induced or tricked by his adversary's misconduct into allowing the
filing deadline to pass. We have generally been much less forgiving in
receiving late filings where the claimant failed to exercise due diligence
in preserving his legal rights.
Id.
93 See Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114 n.7 ("One issue that may arise in such circums-
tances is whether the time begins to run when the injury occurs as opposed to when
the injury reasonably should have been discovered. But this case presents no occa-
sion to resolve that issue."); see also Brake & Grossman, supra note 69, at 876.
194 See Brake & Grossman, supra note 69, at 874.
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ignores the realties of the workplace by interpreting the limitations
period in an unreasonable way195 and disregards the inherent prob-
lems in discrimination that manifest solely in the form of wage dis-
crepancies. 196 The current application of the discovery rule is particu-
larly troublesome when dealing with a plaintiff who had no
knowledge of the alleged discriminatory decision until the limitations
period has already tolled.197 In addition, many empirical studies have
shown that people generally react to latent discrimination in a hesi-
tant fashion, often attributing such discrimination to some unfore-
seen legitimate purpose and often allowing such discrimination to
continue without taking the proper legal action."'98
By and large, arguments for an equitable tolling of the charging
period rarely succeed.9 9 The lower courts have generally adhered to
the Supreme Court's limited guidance and applied the discovery rule
sparingly.200 Although the circuit courts apply the discovery rule dif-
ferently, tolling of the statute is generally only permitted when there
are "exceptional extenuating circumstances, such as deception by the
employer, or a mistaken filing in the wrong forum. 2011 Even a threat
of retaliation upon a plaintiff-employee for bringing a discrimination
lawsuit has failed to merit an equitable tolling of the charging period
in the Seventh Circuit. Worst of all, courts have rarely allowed an
195 See generally Brake & Grossman, supra note 69.
196 Id.; see also Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 645 (2007)
("Pay disparities are thus significantly different from adverse actions 'such as termi-
nation, failure to promote, . . . or refusal to hire,' all involving fully communicated
discrete acts, 'easy to identify' as discriminatory." (citations omitted)).
197 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 645-46; see also Morgan, 536 U.S. at 114.
198 See Brake & Grossman, supra note 69, at 887-88 n.140. Brake observes the ten-
dency to underperceive discrimination as follows:
Evidence from the field of social psychology suggests that the under-
perception of discrimination is more the norm than hypervigilance.
For example, even when women experience behavior that objectively
qualifies as sexual harassment, many do not perceive that they have
been sexually harassed. This example is part of a broader and widely
documented phenomenon whereby members of stigmatized groups
acknowledge that their group experiences discrimination but deny that
they have experienced it individually.
Id. at 887-88 (citations omitted).
199 Larson, supra note 53, § 72.08 n.1.
Id; see also Brake & Grossman, supra note 69, at 875.
201 See Larson, supra note 53, § 72.08.
M See Beckel v. Wal-Mart Assocs., 301 F.3d 621, 624 (7th Cir. 2002). The Beckel
court commented on retaliation as a basis for extending the statute of limitations as
follows:
Rather than deterring a reasonable person from suing, it would in-
crease her incentive to sue by giving her a second claim, in this case a
claim for retaliation on top of her original claim of sexual harassment.
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equitable tolling of the charging period based upon an employee's
lack of information if such deficiency was not caused by the employ-
er's malfeasance. °3
Although the application of the discovery rule has been largely
fruitless, °4 the range of its application within the circuits has been
great. While some early cases discuss the outright refusal to apply the
discovery rule, more recent cases have developed an increasingly
liberal acceptance of the doctrine.20 ' Despite the lack of a uniform
standard, all the circuit courts utilize the discovery doctrine in some
way to "postpone[] the triggering of a limitations period from the
date of injury to the date a plaintiff should reasonably have discov-
ered the injury,, 207 or until the "plaintiff knew or reasonably should
have known that [he or] she was being discriminated against. 20 8 De-
spite this general consensus, the courts are in utter disagreement as
to when a plaintiff should have made such a discovery and what situa-
tions merit the tolling of the statute.
One of the most constrained interpretations of the discovery
rule came out of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in
Hamilton v. 1st Source Bank.0 J.D. Hamilton filed a complaint with
the EEOC claiming age discrimination after he was fired without ad-
• 2 1 0
vance notice. A year later during discovery, Hamilton learned that
he was paid less than his co-workers, leading him to file another
complaint with the EEOC claiming wage discrimination.211  A jury
found for Hamilton on both the wage discrimination and the wrong-
ful discharge claims. 2 A panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed the
To allow the use of retaliation as a basis for extending the statute of li-
mitations would not only distort the doctrine of equitable estoppel but
circumvent the limitations that Title VII imposes on suits for retalia-
tion, including the statute of limitations, which the plaintiffs argument
implies never runs on such a suit.
Id.
I*0 See Brake & Grossman, supra note 69, at 875.
204 Id. at 874-78.
205 See Chapman v. Homco, Inc., 886 F.2d 756, 758 (5th Cir. 1989); Merrill v. S.
Methodist Univ., 806 F.2d 600, 604-05 (5th Cir. 1986).
See Adams v. CBS Broad., Inc., 61 F. App'x 285, 288 (7th Cir. 2003); Carter v.
West Publ'g Co., 225 F.3d 1258, 1265 (11th Cir. 2000); Inglis v. Buena Vista Univ.,
235 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1025 (N.D. Iowa 2002).
207 Adams, 61 F. App'x at 287 (citations omitted).
208 Carter, 225 F.3d at 1265 (citing Ross v. Buckeye Cellulose Corp., 980 F.2d 648,
661 n.19 (11th Cir. 1993)).
928 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
210 Id. at 86--87.
211 Id. at 87.
212 Id.
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jury verdict,213 "reasoning that the 180-day statute of limitations for a
pay discrimination charge does not begin to run until an employee
'discovers or by exercise of reasonable diligence could have discov-
ered that she or he was a victim of pay discrimination. '' 24 The court
reheard the issue based on 1st Source Bank's petition "arguing that
the 'discovery' rule was contrary to congressional intent as well as cir-
cuit precedent, and contending that Hamilton's charge of pay dis-
crimination was time-barred.
1 1
Reversing the judgment, the court posited that "the 'discovery'
rule that Hamilton would have us adopt completely abandons the sta-
tute." 21 6 The court reasoned that Congress has expressly written dis-
covery rules into other statutes and that the absence of such language
here precluded the application of such a rule.21 ' The court further
attacked the discovery rule as a "vague and uncertain period, 218 and
even mentioned the large time gap between the decision to pay Ham-
ilton less and the filing of his claim as evidence that the rule would
overstretch the statute. 19 In rejecting the discovery rule, the court
expressly addressed the difference between wage discrimination and
discriminatory discharge claims, and stated that the distinction was
negligible.220  The court refused to empower Hamilton's assertion
that he was unable to ascertain the discrimination because of his em-
ployer's policies of discouraging discussion about wages between em-
ployees. In general, the court refused to acknowledge the supposi-
tion that adverse pay decisions do not sufficiently put aggrieved
222employees on notice of discrimination.
The dissenting opinion, authored by Judge Sprouse, included an
interesting interpretation of the court's decision by drawing upon the
reasoning of Ricks.2 Judge Sprouse observed the emphasis the Su-
preme Court placed on Ricks's notice of the discrimination, 2 4 and
suggested that "a fair reading of the opinion indicates that notice is
213 Hamilton v. 1st Source Bank, 895 F.2d 159, 165-66 (4th Cir. 1990), rev'd en
banc, 928 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1990).
214 Hamilton, 928 F.2d at 87 (citing Hamilton, 895 F.2d at 165).
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id. at 88.
218 Id.
219 Id. at 88.
220 Hamilton, 928 F.2d at 89.
221 Id. at 89 n.3.
Id. at 86-89.
22 Id. at 91 (Sprouse, J., dissenting).
224 Id.
2009] COMMNT 1049
HeinOnline -- 39 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1049 2009
SETON HALL LAWREVIEW
important in preserving the tenor of statutes... which were enacted
'in a statutory scheme in which laymen, unassisted by trained lawyers,
initiate the process.' 225 Justice Sprouse concluded that the reasoning
of Ricks "support[s] an approach that notice of the decision to take a
discriminatory pay action is the key and recognition of a discovery
rule in this case is consistent with that approach. 226 In line with this
conclusion, Judge Sprouse went on to discuss the nature of pay deci-
sions as opposed to an employer's decision to terminate, and refuted
the majority's assumption that such a difference was negligible.227
Judge Sprouse accurately commented that the "adverse nature of [a
decision to terminate] is inherent and obvious,"2 28 while a pay deci-
sion does not convey such notice "[d] ue to its confidential nature., 229
Judge Sprouse accurately identified both the strong policy reasons for
advocating a discovery rule for wage discrimination cases as well as
such a policy's link to previous case law. The majority opinion, how-
ever, has survived as good case law in the Fourth Circuit and has been
utilized numerous times to quell attempts to invoke the discovery
rule.230
While various other circuits have applied the discovery rule in a
more sensible way, the general approach has still been too narrow to
have a serious impact.2 3 ' The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Cir-
cuit's decision in Amini v. Oberlin College2 32 provides a good example of
the general application of the discovery rule. Relying on Supreme
Court and previous Sixth Circuit precedent, the court held that "the
starting date for the 300-day limitations period is when the plaintiff
learns of the employment decision itself, not when the plaintiff learns
that the employment decision may have been discriminatorily moti-
vated., 23' Although this case involved a failure to hire and not wage
discrimination, the Sixth Circuit does not differentiate between the
225 Id. (citation omitted).
226 Hamilton, 928 F.2d at 91.
227 Id. at 92.
228 Id.
229 Id.
230 See Young v. Barnhart, 52 F. App'x 191 (4th Cir. 2002); Nelson v. Lockheed
Missiles & Space Co., No. 97-1430, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 33322 (4th Cir. Nov. 24,
1997); Kannapel v. Hudson, No. 93-1160, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 31519 (4th Cir. Dec.
3, 1993); Legrande v. ALCOA, 1:05CV00376, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 37368 (M.D.N.C.
May 24, 2006); Steven v. Del Webb Cmtys., Inc., 456 F. Supp. 2d 698 (D.S.C. 2006).
Hamilton has also been followed in the Tenth Circuit. See generally Lewis v. Glickman,
104 F. Supp. 2d 1311 (D. Kan. 2000).
231 See supra note 134.
232 259 F.3d 493 (6th Cir. 2001).
233 Id. at 498.
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two and has applied this case as its discovery rule standard. 3 4 The
standard followed by this court does not take into account an em-
ployee's inability to discover the discriminatory nature of adverse pay
decisions or the realities of the workplace. While such a standard
may provide justice for those with adequate notice of adverse deci-
sions, those who are aware of the decision but not of its adverse na-
ture are left without a remedy. Wage discrimination creates this exact
situation time and time again, and the denial of a separate standard
for such cases allows discrimination to continue in the mannerJustice
Ginsburg cautioned against in her dissenting opinion in Ledbetter.23
In addition to limiting the starting date of the limitations period,
the court in Amini affirmed the use of a five-part test to determine
when an equitable tolling of the statute was merited. 236 The test gen-
erally referred to the plaintiffs knowledge of the filing requirement
itself, 2 37 making no mention of a lack of information about the dis-
criminatory decision or its discriminatory nature. Such a limited ap-
plication of the doctrine of equitable tolling again leaves unknowing
victims of wage discrimination with no remedy upon receiving notice
of their employer's discriminatory motives.
238
The main question left open for debate between the circuits is
"whether the statute of limitations should be tolled when the plaintiff
is not reasonably aware of the discriminatory act or whether the limi-
tations period should be tolled only when the defendant affirmatively
23 See Stevenson v. Rayloc, 114 F. App'x 167 (6th Cir. 2004); Caruso v. Alltel
Corp., 113 F. App'x 90 (6th Cir. 2004); Doan v. NSK Corp., 97 F. App'x 555 (6th Cir.
2004); Knapp v. City of Columbus, 93 F. App'x 718 (6th Cir. 2004).
235 Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 648-57 (2007) (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting); see also Mark Esposito, Note, Massachusetts Pay Equity and its Lim-
its, 87 B.U. L. REv. 911,929-32 (2007).
236 Amini, 259 F.3d at 500.
237 Id. The test was stated as follows:
In determining whether the equitable tolling of the EEOC filing period
is appropriate in a given case, we have consistently taken into consider-
ation the following five factors: 1) lack of notice of the filing require-
ment; 2) lack of constructive knowledge of the filing requirement; 3)
diligence in pursuing one's fights; 4) absence of prejudice to the de-
fendant; and 5) the plaintiffs reasonableness in remaining ignorant of
the particular legal requirement for filing his claim.
Id.
23 As stated throughout, the mere knowledge of a pay decision generally does not
provide a sufficient impetus to put the employee on notice of the discrimination.
Some additional information, such as learning that he or she is paid less than his or
her co-workers, would suffice as putting the employee on notice. The main idea is
that the employee is or should be aware of the discriminatory intent behind the pay
decision.
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misleads the plaintiff."219 Once again, other circuit courts have inter-
preted the discovery rule as the Sixth Circuit has, and have generally
allowed the application of the discovery rule "only to include discov-
ery of the adverse employment action, not the discovery of facts sug-
gesting the employer's discriminatory motive. ,240 Taken a step fur-
ther, the courts have typically allowed equitable tolling only when the
plaintiff can show that his or her employer took part in purposeful
action to delay the filing of the plaintiff's claim. 24' The discovery rule
has generally been available only in such limited circumstances and
its effectiveness has been limited to extreme cases of concealment or
threats by the employer and other extenuating circumstances, such as
the presence of mental incompetence. 42 Unfortunately, the discov-
ery rule has done little to help victims of wage discrimination who
were not provided with information-creating an inference that their
employer had discriminated against them. However, the Jack of
knowledge relating to compensation, coupled with social norms dis-
couraging people from discussing their salaries, compels an even
broader application of the discovery rule in the context of wage dis-
crimination.243
B. A Robust Discovery Doctrine in Place of the Act
In response to the clear unfairness of the standard associated
with wage discrimination, the 11 1 th Congress and President Obama
have passed the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act, revealing their unequivocal
intent to extend the application of Title VII and to allow victims of
239 Fisher, supra note 9, at 717.
240 Brake & Grossman, supra note 69, at 877; see also Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein,
Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1386 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding the discovery rule
could act to toll the charging period until the plaintiff's notice of the employer's ac-
tion, rather than the later discovery of evidence suggesting discrimination); Cada v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 453 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding the same as
Oshiver).
241 See Chaffin v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 904 F.2d 1269 (8th Cir. 1990); Stark v. Dynas-
can Corp., 902 F.2d 549 (7th Cir. 1990); Cooper v. Wawa, Inc., No. 94-5920, 1995 WL
50061 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 2, 1995). In Cooper, the plaintiff missed an employment oppor-
tunity because the employer did not notify the employee that he had won the bid for
thejob. Id. at *1. The employee did not discover that his bid had been accepted un-
til more than two years after the fact, and upon learning of this he filed a charge with
the EEOC. Id. The court held that equitable tolling was not warranted since the
plaintiff did not allege that the employer actively misled him. Id.
242 See generally Larson, supra note 53.
243 See generally Brake & Grossman, supra note 69; see also Ledbetter v. Goodyear
Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 648-57 (2007) (Ginsburgj., dissenting).
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wage discrimination a lengthened charging period. 2" As stated
above, however, the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act and the extension of the
continuing violation doctrine affords too extensive a charging period
which will harmfully disrupt established judicial progeny.245 Facially
neutral wage discrimination violations, moreover, are not "continu-
ing" in nature, but are rather discrete acts with continuing effects.2 16
As the Supreme Court noted in Ledbetter, shifting the intent of the
previous discriminatory pay decision to the current issuing of pay-
checks is "unsound" and "would shift intent from one act (the act
that consummates the discriminatory employment practice) to a later
act that was not performed with bias or discriminatory motive. 247
"The effect of this shift would be to impose liability in the absence of
the requisite intent., 241 Wage discrimination cases do not comprise
"present violations" because of the lack of intent, but nevertheless,
present a situation in which many employees face discrimination
without adequate protection from the law.
Although the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act will seek to rectify the harm
felt by victims of wage discrimination, the legislation will open the
door to stale claims and allow plaintiffs too large a window of recov-
ery. The application of a more robust discovery rule, however,
would allow victims of wage discrimination an adequate remedy while
still preserving the nature of the continuing violation doctrine. Con-
gress should adopt a discovery rule allowing the tolling of the charg-
ing period until employees received actual or constructive notice that
the decisions affecting their pay may have been discriminatory.20
Such a standard provides a more narrowly tailored response to the
inequity apparent in Ledbetter and other case law cited in this Com-
ment, 25 and would also allow for a more concrete time period for de-
fining the beginning of the charging period.
Although its application has been extremely limited, a bold dis-
covery doctrine of this nature was recently employed by the U.S.
244 See generally Lilly Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009, Public Law No. 111-2, 123 Stat.
5 (2009); see also supra Part III.
245 Id.
246 See supra Part II.
247 Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 629.
248 Id.
249 See supra Part III.
250 The Court may be more comfortable with this standard than its precedent sug-
gests given the Court's continual recognition of the absence of an assertion of the
discovery rule in both Morgan and Ledbetter. Congress, however, has its eye currently
set on amending Title VII, and is the more likely candidate for the implementation
of this standard. Simply writing this discovery rule into the statute would suffice.
251 See supra Part II.
20091 1053
HeinOnline -- 39 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1053 2009
SETON HALL LA W REVIEW
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. In Adams v. CBS Broadcast-
ing, Inc., 252 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit over-
turned a lower decision denying the application of the discovery
rule.2 5 ' A year after Adams was hired as a technician, she discovered
from some of her co-workers that her wage had been calculated diffe-
254
rently than other technicians with similar experience . The district
court concluded that the discovery rule was inapplicable because
Adams "knew when she was hired that.., some technicians were paid
more than her;... the CBA set minimum wages based upon years of
CBS experience, [sic] and . .. Adams knew how many years of expe-
rience-with CBS or otherwise-she had accumulated. 255 Acknowl-
edging that the "discovery rule postpones the triggering of a limita-
tions period from the date of injury to the date a plaintiff should
reasonably have discovered the injury,"' 56 the circuit court overturned
the decision and held that Adams's charge was timely.2 57 The court
reasoned that Adams could not have known about the discrepancy in
her salary calculation until such facts were presented to her by her co-
workers, and therefore her claim accrued when her co-workers in-
formed her of the discrepancy. 58
The standard established by this case allows victims of wage dis-
crimination an adequate remedy and embodies the broad remedial
purpose of Title VII.259 The facts of Adams also make clear that an
evaluation of the application of this new discovery rule is fact-
intensive and should be done carefully on a case-by-case basis. As the
court acknowledged, Adams was aware that she was paid less than
260
some of her co-workers. Some courts could determine that such
knowledge would suffice as constructive knowledge. However, the
fact that Adams had no possible way of knowing that her salary was
calculated in a discriminatory fashion until others told her compelled
the court to toll the charging period despite her knowledge that oth-
ers were paid more than her.261
252 61 F. App'x 285 (7th Cir. 2003).
253 Id. at 287-88.
254 Id. at 286-87.
255 Id. at 287.
256 Id. (citing Clark v. City of Braidwood, 318 F.3d 764, 767 (7th Cir. 2003)). Clark
acknowledged the application of a discovery rule but did not flesh out the doctrine's
ap lication as the court did in Adams.
57 Id. at 287-88.
2 Adams, 61 F. App'x at 287-88.
25 See generally Fisher, supra note 9, at 712.
2 Adams, 61 F. App'x at 287.
261 Id. at 287-89.
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Applying this standard to other wage discrimination cases such
as Ledbetter, 2 Hamilton, and Amini would provide an equitable solu-
tion without disturbing prior precedent. 26 3 In fact, a broad discovery
rule corresponds well with the reasoning of Ricks, Ledbetter, and
Evans.26 Aggrieved plaintiffs would receive adequate notice of the
possible discriminatory acts of their employers,6 2 while the principles
underlying the continuing violation doctrine would not be dis-
turbed. 6 Applying the standard proposed by the Ledbetter Fair Pay
Act, on the other hand, would allow plaintiffs such as Adams, Ledbet-
262 In Ledbetter, the Court recognized that a discussion about the discovery rule
may have been appropriate, but declined to address this issue because Ledbetter did
not raise it. Ledbetter v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 550 U.S. 618, 642 n.10 (2007)
("We have previously declined to address whether Title VII suits are amenable to a
discovery rule. Because Ledbetter does not argue that such a rule would change the
outcome in her case, we have no occasion to address this issue.").
263 Ledbetter, Hamilton, and Amini's claims would have been considered timely
as they filed their claims within the requisite time following their discovery of the al-
leged discrimination. The period when each made their discovery was easily ascer-
tainable. Such a result allows for an adequate recovery for those facing discrimina-
tion in accordance with the goals of Title VII without opening the employer up to
unreasonable potential liability in the future.
24 See supra notes 172-182 and accompanying text. A broad discovery rule would
match the Court's recognition of the importance of notice in Ricks, as well as the
Court's recognition of Ledbetter's lack of information in Ledbetter. See supra notes
86-95 and accompanying text; see Ledbetter, 550 U.S. at 621-24. This standard would
also further justify the Court's stance in Evans in light of the Ledbetter Court's reliance
on Evans.
265 See Inglis v. Buena Vista Univ., 235 F. Supp. 2d 1009, 1025-26 (N.D. Iowa
2002) for a discussion of the rationale for applying such a rule:
The rationale underlying application of this principle to pay discrimi-
nation cases is obvious: it would be unfair to require a plaintiff to file a
charge of discrimination when she has no knowledge of and could not
have reasonably ascertained what similarly situated male coworkers
were earning. Not until a discriminatory pay claimant knows she is
earning less than similarly situated males does she know she is being
discriminated against and is on notice of the need to assert her rights.
If equitable tolling did not apply, maintaining strict salary confidential-
ity policies in most circumstances would isolate employers from Title
VII liability because the filing period would pass before a victim of dis-
crimination learned that she was being discriminated against. ...
Equitable tolling in pay discrimination cases, which starts the limita-
tions clock running when a pay discrimination claimant knows or
should know that she is being discriminated against, is, in this court's
view, the best reading of Morgan and of its impact on pay discrimina-
tion claims. This is so because this interpretation is faithful to the Mor-
gan Court's holding that discrete discriminatory acts are not actionable
if time-barred, as well as is faithful to the Bazemore Court's holding in
pattern-or-practice pay discrimination cases.
Id.
2 Namely, the requirement that a present violation take place.
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ter, and Hamilton to sit on their rights2 67 and would violate the strong
policies for setting tangible limitations periods, as well as the original
congressional intent in creating such a period. 268 Applying the cur-
rent doctrines without this new discovery rule presents an even more
worrisome result, as plaintiffs without adequate notice would be prec-
luded from exercising their rights. The adoption of a broad discov-
ery rule provides a happy medium between precluding these ag-
grieved plaintiffs from recovery and allowing them to re-toll the
limitations period throughout their employment regardless of their
knowledge of their employers' discrimination. Although the discov-
ery rule may allow some plaintiffs to bring their claims years after the
discriminatory action, the rule would both provide a more concrete
starting point for the tolling of the limitations period than the Led-
better Fair Pay Act proposes and decrease the possibility that such
stale claims would arise, as plaintiffs could not preserve their claims
by simply receiving any form of compensation.
The implementation of a broad discovery rule could also provide
an incentive for employers to share wage-related information more
freely and shy away from policies prohibiting employees from discuss-
ing their compensation. Although employers' policies are outside of
the scope of the judiciary's concern, incentives for employers to limit
their possible liability stemming from wage discrimination cases26 9
could help prevent such discrimination by placing these previously
secret decisions out in the open. Employers could also cap the possi-
ble litigation over these issues by providing employees with adequate
information regarding their compensation up front, thereby limiting
the application of the discovery rule. 7°
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's limiting of the paycheck accrual rule in
Ledbetter v. Goodyear left plaintiffs facing latent wage discrimination
267 Any compensation conveyed to the plaintiff in the future that was affected by
the previous decision would toll the statute. Although Ledbetter and Hamilton are
no longer employed by the defendants in their respective cases, many wage discrimi-
nation cases involve current employees who, under Congress's proposed legislation,
would be allowed to consciously stow their cause of action. Although most plaintiffs
would not sit on their rights in this manner, such a possibility exists and was not an
intended consequence of Title VII. See Fisher, supra note 9, at 712.
268 See supra Part III.
2 Employers who share wage-related information or allow their employees to do
so may benefit by limiting the time period.
270 Such a policy is not the intended goal of the standard proposed by this Com-
ment but a mere speculative constructive corollary.
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without an adequate remedy. In compliance with Justice Ginsburg's
plea, Congress attempted to solve this problem and restore the broad
remedial purpose of Title VII by creating the Ledbetter Fair Pay Act.
The Act, however, would overstretch the application of the continu-
ing violation doctrine and allows for too broad a period of recovery.
To provide victims of wage discrimination an adequate remedy with-
out leaving employers susceptible to excessive liability or overextend-
ing the continuing violation theory, Congress should repeal the Led-
better Fair Pay Act and draft a broad discovery rule into Title VII.
The rule should state that, in the case of wage discrimination, 71 the
limitations period begins to run when the plaintiff knew or should
have known that the adverse pay decision may have been discrimina-
tory. A number of events could trigger such recognition, resulting in
a fact-intensive inquiry. Such a doctrine would adhere to the broad
remedial purpose of Title VII as well as preserve established
precedent.
271 Congress would have to define the term "wage discrimination." The definition
would have to encompass discrimination manifesting itself in the form of a wage dis-
crepancy.
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